-->
Search the ArchivesNavigationContact InformationThe Citizen Newspapers For Advertising Information Email us your news! For technical difficulties |
What is Racism?Nobel laureate James Watson, co-discoverer of the DNA helix, recently reported that he is “inherently gloomy” about the prospect of Africa” because “all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours, whereas all the testing says not really.” He also noted that, while he hoped that all races were equal, “people who have to deal with black employees find this is not true.” How’s that for an incendiary remark? Watson almost immediately retracted his comments, but not until he had created an uproar. The London Science Museum, for instance, cancelled Watson’s upcoming talk there, claiming that such talk was “beyond the point of acceptable debate.” I believe that racism is immoral and that we, as a society, do well in censuring (though not necessarily censoring) racist remarks and hate speech. Were Watson’s comments racist? It may seem that the obvious answer is yes. How could someone assert the essential inequality of the races without harboring racist or White Supremacist attitudes? Are not all people of good will committed to the principle of equality? Don’t his remarks fly in the face of the conviction that all men are created equal? And, for all I know, Watson may lead a secret life as a sheet-wearing, cross-burning disciple of Nathan Bedford Forrest. But is the belief in this sort of racial inequality necessarily the result of a harbored racism? I have no doubt that assertions such as Watson’s are, more often than not, indications of vice. One might be overly eager to draw unflattering conclusions about people one already disdains. When those conclusions fly in the face of clear evidence to the contrary, then a character defect is to blame. But the central question to be addressed is this: Does morality require a belief in the matter of fact equality of all races? I believe that it does not and, indeed, cannot. What if, when all of the evidence was in, it became apparent that one race is, on average, more or less intelligent than other races? Would we be virtuous in blinding ourselves to this truth? Our noble concern for moral equality has, I think, led us as a society into a great deal of confusion on such issues. Consider the controversial scientific discipline known as sociobiology, or, as it is sometimes called, evolutionary psychology. Sociobiologists claim that evolution explains much of human behavior and human psychology just as surely as it explains the behavior and emotional life of non-human animals. Some objections to sociobiology are scientific in nature. For instance, might sociobiologists be a bit too eager to find a genetic explanation for a widespread trait when some other, perhaps cultural, explanation is in order? Daniel Dennett observes that primitive tribesmen have, everywhere and always thrown their spears pointy end first. But there is no reason to posit a “pointy-end-first gene.” He’s likely right about this. But sociobiology is often castigated for political reasons. It is said that if various behaviors that humans do in fact display are deemed natural features of human psychology that have been hard-wired in by our evolution, then those behaviors, whatever they are, would find sociobiological justification. Xenophobia, racism and male dominance, for instance, would be seen as normal and natural, despite politically correct efforts otherwise. But surely this is an odd sort of objection to a project that purports to be an empirically based science? First, even if it were discovered that humans have a natural, inborn tendency to X, it need not follow that X is justified. I may be miserly and mean by nature, but it does not follow that my meanness is not a vice anymore than the discovery that I am genetically disposed to a given cancer is reason to encourage tumor growth. More important, truth—-scientific or otherwise—-is not a wax nose that may be adjusted to fit our preferences. One is reminded of a fairly recent article in the satirical publication The Onion. The story documented protests from fundamentalists against the second law of thermodynamics. The complaint was that the notion that entropy is increasing is “depressing” and discourages an overall hopeful outlook. The humor was certainly not lost on The Onion’s delighted readers. Here, fundamentalist Christians were the butt of the joke. But there is a politically correct variety of fundamentalism that is equally ridiculous. I can recall being told by one of my grade school teachers that it is wrong to make generalizations about people. And the lesson was given in the context of what is wrong with prejudice. I also recall wondering then why we should think up front that such generalizations are always wrong. For instance, on an earlier occasion, Watson was quoted as saying that there are “latin lovers” but you never hear of “English lovers.” His point was that, as a rule, those who live in the warmer Mediterranean climes have libidos to match, whereas it is mainly the upper lip that the Brits manage to keep stiff. Even if true, this would be consistent with our discovering that some Brits are amorous and some Spaniards prefer to sleep alone. (Similarly, Watson’s original remark regarding those of African descent, even if it were true, is compatible with, say, the brilliance of a Condoleeza Rice and the apparent doltishness of her boss.) My point here is that, possibly, some “sweeping generalizations” are simply true, regardless of any of our preferences. Were a researcher to report that, after careful and extensive controlled experiments, he has concluded that, all other things equal, your average Swede is smarter than your average Norwegian, the proper response would be an assessment of the study in order to determine whether the conclusion was, in fact, borne out. We cannot know in advance, apriori, that such a claim is false. Nor have we reason to suppose that the researcher harbors dark thoughts about Norwegians or that the research was skewed by the personal vice of the researcher. In her masterful Beast and Man, Mary Midgley observes that a commitment to equality does not entail a commitment to sameness. It’s an important point. In her hands, “equality” is a moral concept. To be committed to the moral equality of all people is to think that all persons are of equal moral worth and that their basic interests count equally. And this commitment stands whether or not there is “sameness” in merit or ability. The doctrine that all persons are created equal is decidedly not the suggestion that, at birth, each human being has a potential equal to that of every other human being. We needn’t, that is, assume that “newborn babies are what bear cubs were once supposed to be—indeterminate lumps of animal protoplasm, needing to be licked into shape by their elders,” as Midgley humorously puts it. Different predispositions and potentialities may be a part of our respective original equipment, and it is the role of the scientist, not the moral philosopher, to determine whether any of those differences correlate with, say, gender or ethnicity. (A myth of our day is that little boys and little girls are like Midgley’s “protoplasm” in that all gender specific predispositions are the product of nurture rather than nature. That is, boys are boys only because they were handed Tonka trucks to play with as tots, whereas the girls were given baby dolls. The myth has been an important plank in the modern feminist platform, and it is clear to my mind that it is ideologically-driven bad science.) The point is even more important when we realize the difference between the two ways in which a person might be said to possess value. An employee is extrinsically or instrumentally valuable to a company insofar as she is loyal and industrious. A man is valuable as a citizen insofar as he abides by the laws, contributes to societal good, educates himself, votes and perhaps keeps his lawn free of dandelions. But the ultimate worth of the employee or the citizen as persons depends upon none of these things. On the traditional and, I think, correct view, persons are intrinsically valuable. Their worth is inherent in virtue of the fact that they are persons. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant expressed this idea by saying that persons have dignity as opposed to mere price or a sort of “market value. As such, it is possible for a person to be utterly lacking in extrinsic value while his intrinsic value is undiminished. There may well be useless people but there is no such thing as a worthless person, and this is precisely because worth is in no way a function of usefulness. Intelligent people possess no more inherent worth than stupid people. I suggest that it is largely because we have lost sight of the notion of dignity, and the way in which it is disconnected from any and all forms of instrumental value, that we have blurred the notions of moral equality and matter-of-fact equality. We worry that worth is determined by performance, and are thus outraged when anyone suggests that some perform better than others. Here, our moral outrage is misplaced. All persons of good will are committed to the dignity and moral equality of all humanity. All reasonable people are committed to pursuing truth, wherever it leads and however contrary to our predilections it may be. As it happens, I think that Watson's assertions of ethnically based differences in intelligence is mistaken. But my thinking this is no indication--at least not primarily--of my moral character. muddle's blog | login to post comments |