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President’s ‘surge’ plan may have a sinister complement: The ‘goad’ optionTue, 01/16/2007 - 4:23pm
By: Letters to the ...
President Bush’s latest attempt to salvage his woefully ineffective Iraq policy is predicated upon the assumption that a rather minor “surge” in the number of American troops, 17,500, into Baghdad will prove sufficient to turn the tide in a growing multifaceted insurgent environment (at last count there were 23 separate militia groups in Baghdad alone). One element that has not been examined in our likely upcoming “surge” in Iraq is the fact that we are about to ratchet up what is the most challenging, tactically difficult and dangerous type of warfare: combat in cities and built-up areas. We are not looking at a town or village, but a major metropolitan area, Baghdad, with a civilian population of somewhere between 6 and 7 million inhabitants, many of whom are women, children and the elderly. Among these millions of civilian inhabitants is an unknown number of what are generally described as “insurgents,” that is thousands of armed individuals, who, for whatever reason(s), will do everything in their power to kill American and Iraqi soldiers. They will: not follow the general guidelines of conventional combat; be dressed in civilian clothes; not appear in military formations; use small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and, worst of all, be virtually indistinguishable from the general civilian population. With the above scenario, our soldiers are expected to root out the insurgents while, all the time, keeping innocent civilian casualties to an absolute minimum and win the “hearts and minds” of the noncombatant Iraqis. Do we realize just what risks our troops are about to face? They will be inserted into a truly hostile environment where virtually any of 7 million or so inhabitants could be an “insurgent” or, even more difficult to determine, an “insurgent supporter.” What are the rules of engagement? Who is in command, Iraqi or American officers? We are expecting one tremendous degree of a combination of patience and discipline from an American soldier in his/her late teens/early 20s who will have to determine, instantaneously, if that shadow in a window from where enemy fire came seconds ago is that of an “insurgent” or innocent civilian who may have been used as a shield. Of course there are examples of successful combat in cities, the prime one being that of Berlin at the end of World War II. But, let us be honest; the invading hordes of the Soviet Red Army were not restrained by the same conditions our soldiers will face in Baghdad. The Red Army was eminently successful as the rules of engagement by which they played were quite simple: if ”it” moved and was unidentified, destroy it! In addition, the German Army was outfitted in combat uniforms and easily discernible from the civilian population. Furthermore, if enemy fire were coming from a building, destroy it by any means possible. As a last thought, try and remember just what Berlin looked like from the air after the successful “combat in cities” operation was finished: rubble! We too are fully capable of reducing a major city, Baghdad, to rubble, but is that what will be required for “victory”? Will we replay yet another Vietnam mantra of dubious value, “we had to destroy the village to save it”? Only this time it is not a village, but a major, historic city of millions. Is that what will be required to win the “hearts and minds” of a reduced number of residents of Baghdad? And, last, but not least, how many more American lives will have been sacrificed with, in all likelihood, the ”mission,” whatever the latest definition will be at that point in time, still not accomplished? Hopefully, despite the lack, to date, of an outpouring of broad-based U.S. domestic support (36 percent approve of the “surge”), this change in strategy will prove the doubters wrong and lead to a robust effort by the Iraqi armed forces and national police, backed by the U.S. military, that will set the stage for a gradual and steady reduction in violence and the growth and spreading of both economic development and democratic government. But, if the “surge” should prove to be as ineffective as previous “plus ups” in U.S. troop strength have shown, there is yet one additional “card” to be played by the Bush administration: the goading of Iran into performing some blatantly hostile act, of which they are eminently capable, either against U. S. forces directly or U.S. regional interests. Why, one may ask, should there be any real concern that this administration will goad Iran into acting in a manner which will lead to a direct confrontation with the United States? Let us assume, for the purposes of discussion, that the upcoming U.S. “surge” does not lead to a lessening of insurgent combat in Iraq and that the situation actually worsens. How does President Bush react? The chances of him withdrawing, or downsizing, U.S. forces devoted to the Iraq insurgency are, based on past actions and statements, extremely low. So how does one save the situation? Simple, expand the area of operations by air/cruise missile attacks on Iran and cite their support for insurgent elements in Iraq and associated meddling. The scene for the above scenario is already being set. The U.S. Central Command, responsible for the Persian Gulf region, will shortly be under the command of a U.S. Navy admiral for the first time in its history. With the prime military activity in his area of operations being ground combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, why would one place an undoubtedly extremely qualified senior naval aviator, whose background is in carrier operations and strategic nuclear warfare (he once led the Strategic Command) in charge of what is primarily a ground war? Think of “shock and awe” of March 2003. In addition, we are in the process of dispatching a second carrier battle group and Patriot antimissile unit to the area. Who in the area presents a missile threat? Hint, it is not Iraq or Afghanistan. How about Iran? Bingo! Now let us get to the “goading“ scenario. For starters, how about the U.S seizing five or six Iranians who are associated with what is about to become an Iranian Consulate in the Kurdish area of Iraq and not even tell the Kurdish or Iraqi authorities that such an event is about to transpire? Additionally, let us start emphasizing the supposedly greatly increased supply of sophisticated weapons and improvised explosive devices to Shiite insurgents by the Iranians? Add in a potential border incident. Another bingo! What follows is a prime-time TV appearance by President Bush informing us that, based on all available intelligence (read selective “cherry picking” of such intelligence a la the rationale for the invasion of Iraq) he has no other choice than to authorize air and cruise missile attacks on military and suspected nuclear development sites in Iran to “protect the American people.” The appeal goes out that this was the last option that the President was forced to “unwillingly” implement and he did so with a heavy heart. The positive poll ratings for the wartime commander in chief increase substantially. If this is considered to be totally unbelievable, consider for a moment the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of Aug. 7, 1964 and what followed; for those too young to remember: Vietnam. Both of the above factors, the “surge” and attacking Iran, involve one common element: the Congress of the United States. There is much talk of the Democratic Congress somehow not approving funds for the ”surge.” Forget it, the funding will be provided and the “surge” will transpire. The truly paramount issue is not the issue of “surge” funding, but that of a truly bipartisan Congress taking an early stand concerning the legality of President Bush attacking another sovereign nation, Iran, without their approval. The most sobering fact to face is: if somehow the Congress of the United States shirks its duty concerning Iran, this nation will have the same wartime commander in chief and his unyielding certitude, until January 2009, expanding military operations in that nation, as the one who initiated our current dilemma in Iraq. Now, if that scenario does not cause serious, widespread, national concern it takes one tremendous stretch of the imagination to think what would. Wade J. Williams 
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