What will happen? Many things, not all bad

Tue, 02/13/2007 - 5:20pm
By: Letters to the ...

In a recent letter, “What happens in Iraq if we pull out,” (The Citizen, Feb. 6), Trey Hoffman poses the question: If we withdraw our troops now from Iraq, what will happen to the Kurds, Sunnis in Shi’ite areas, Shi’ites in Sunni areas and the helpless, innocent women and children?

It is an excellent question and I believe that a partial answer can be found in assessing the situation as it exists now with our troops in Iraq.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that about 2 million Iraqis have fled the country. An additional 1.7 million people are displaced inside Iraq. A UN report on human rights put the civilian death toll in 2006 at 34,452. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official reported that 1,990 civilians were killed in January, which he said was the highest number since the organization started keeping the statistics.

Mr. Hoffman also states that he does not understand those advocating withdrawal from Iraq; those who “cry about civilian casualties, then advocate a policy which would result in the deaths of thousands of civilians.”

He is probably right. Almost certainly thousands more will die in Iraq under any circumstances. Thousands and thousands have already died. Tens of thousands. Hundreds of thousands. These are the inevitable consequences of the elective and unnecessary war which Mr. Hoffman and other Republican leaders have supported from the beginning. Sadly, Mr. Hoffman can see only one option: more war with an increase in troops.

It is fair to assess the consequences of Mr. Hoffman’s proposal. A new, declassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), “Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,” a joint report filed by all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, assumes the surge in troops Mr. Hoffman advocates but nevertheless predicts a bleak picture with no realistic prospect of victory. The NIE states:

• “...the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006.”

• “...the Iraqi Security Forces ... will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities...”

• “Iranian lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants clearly intensifies the conflict in Iraq.”

• “Syria continues to provide safe haven for expatriate Iraqi Baathists and to take less than adequate measures to stop the flow of foreign jihadists into Iraq.”

• “... the term ‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict.”

The NIE warns of an increasingly rapid breakdown of the Iraqi government and predicts three scenarios: chaos leading to partition; emergence of a Shia strongman; and in the worse case, anarchic fragmentation of power. This is especially alarming in light of the fact that, with every other Iraq-related NIE, the worse case scenario has been surpassed.

The Iraq Study Group proposed a regional dialog among the Middle Eastern states in an effort to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict. This proposal, the only realistic means of containing or ending the conflict, was immediately rejected by the administration as a form of “appeasement.”

The administration’s sycophants ridiculed the idea of engaging Iran and Syria, claiming these countries have no common cause with the U.S.

Of the six big regional actors in the Middle East: Israel, Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Saudi Arabia, the administration has made it illegal to talk or negotiate with Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Neoconservative ideology has maintained its purity even as over 3,000 American soldiers have died with no end in sight.

Syria has been heavily affected by economic sanctions, forcing them to rely on their historical foe Iran for funding of their military. The secular Alawite Shia government in Syria maintains a precarious balance in the predominantly Sunni country. The Iranian Shias consider the Alawite sect apostates but support them in preference to Sunni domination of Syria and as a means to funnel arms and support to Hezbollah.

A negotiated return of a demilitarized Golan Heights to Syria would solidify Assad’s rule in Syria. Coupled with the withdrawal of Syrian support for Hezbollah and Hamas and the ending of economic sanctions, Syria could emerge from Iranian domination and achieve peace with Israel.

Iran has been the main beneficiary of the conflict in Iraq. However, a total collapse of Iraq and an escalation of the Shia/Sunni civil war there will inevitably cause Saudi Arabia to provide massive support for the Sunni minority in Iraq. The risk of an Iranian and Saudi proxy war in the region would be cataclysmic for Iran.

If Saudi Arabia flooded the market with oil and pushed the price to $30 per barrel, Iran’s economy would collapse as would, almost inevitably, its government. Nor can Iran be sure that the chaotic violence by militias can be confined inside of Iraq given the historic animosity between the Persian and Arab countries.

Saudi Arabia is also at risk of major internal dissent from its minority Shia population if it is forced to provide overt support for the Iraqi Sunnis. Likewise, Jordan is already staggering under the weight of absorbing almost a million Iraqi refugees and faces the prospect of being trapped between an anarchic Iraq and the already radicalized Fatah and Hamas factions in Palestine.

These considerations stand by themselves without any regard to any alliance or animosity with the United States. Each of these countries has a strong self-interest in bringing about an end to the Iraqi war or, at the least, a containment of the conflict.

A regional solution, involving all of these parties with the additional support of the United Nations and the European Union, holds promise for stabilization of the region, the undercutting of Hezbollah and Hamas, containing the conflict in Iraq, strengthening of the Iraqi government and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region.

This requires no concessions from the U.S. except a willingness to initiate diplomatic negotiations. It is complex. It will be extremely difficult. There is no guarantee of success. Surely it is worth trying.

Or we could follow Mr. Hoffman’s advice to escalate and continue the war.

Jeff Carter
Peachtree City, Ga.

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