The Fayette Citizen-News Page

Wednesday, June 25, 2003

Harris, Sams sought to 'throw the book' at DUI golf cart operator

By JOHN MUNFORD
jmunford@TheCitizenNews.com

The court case that touched off questions about whether unlicensed drivers can operate golf carts in Peachtree City began with a prosecutor who wanted to aggressively prosecute a man facing his sixth DUI charge.

State Court Solicitor Steve Harris wanted to "throw the book" at William T. Coker, 34, of Peachtree City, Harris said.

"Because of his driving record, it was my obligation to prosecute him to the fullest extent possible," Harris said. "And that included prosecuting the suspended license charge."

Coker was convicted by a jury of both counts, and State Court Judge Fletcher Sams sentenced Coker on Jan. 10, 2002 to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine.

In the appeal, attorney Lloyd Walker argued that Judge Sams should not have instructed the jury that a driver's license was required to drive a golf cart on a public highway. Walker also argued that the evidence wasn't sufficient for the conviction and that Sams ruled the city's golf cart ordinance allowing unlicensed drivers unconstitutional.

Sams told The Citizen that he never ruled that the city's ordinance was unconstitutional, but he said it would be unconstitutional for a city ordinance to supercede a state ordinance.

The appeals court ruled that Sams' actions in the case were proper and upheld Coker's conviction.

"I understand I may not be too popular in some circles right now," Sams said Monday afternoon. "But my oath of office was not taken to be politically popular;it's to uphold the law. It's there and the law has to be respected until we can legally change the law."

Coker was originally arrested on the charges July 21, 2001 after 1 a.m. when Peachtree City police officer Chris Robison saw him driving on Northlake Drive and Aberdeen Parkway. Robison testified that he stopped Coker because it was "kind of suspicious (with) it being 1:11 in the morning and that he's got the golf cart out on the roadway."

Robison also testified that there had been problems in the area with stolen golf carts in Aberdeen Village and at the Wyndham Peachtree Executive Conference Center.

Coker was first charged with driving while declared a habitual violator, which would have been in the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, but that charge was later reduced to DUI, putting the case in State Court, Harris said.

The jury also found Coker not guilty of obstruction of a law enforcement officer.

When Judge Sams sentenced Coker after the jury's verdict he urged Coker to seek treatment while he is incarcerated.

"Now, Mr. Coker, this is not going to keep you in jail forever, but I am convinced if you don't change your ways as soon as you get out, you're going to be another threat to society," Sams said. "If I could, I would have sheriff (Randall) Johnson jack up a corner of the jail and put you underneath it. But you will get out some day...."

Coker was represented at the trial by court-appointed attorney Linda Roeding Wells during the two-day trial, which was prosecuted by assistant state court solicitor Lura Landis.

Although this issue has been discussed by attorneys dating back to Judge Sams' tenure as Fayette County District Attorney, this is the first time the matter has come to a head in state court, Sams noted.

There have been roughly a half-dozen cases with similar charges filed against teen and youth golf cart drivers, but they were dropped by the solicitor's office because "we didn't think it was appropriate to hold them accountable for the mixed messages they were getting," Harris said, referring to the conflicts between the Peachtree City ordinances and the state law.

Text of Appeals Court ruling on golf carts

Following is the full text of the recent opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The opinion was written by Judge J. Miller and concurred by Judge C.J. Smith and Judge P.J. Ruffin.

A jury found William Coker guilty of DUI and of driving with a suspended license. Coker was stopped by police while driving a golf cart on a public highway in Peachtree City. He appeals only the conviction for driving with a suspended license, arguing that (i) the evidence did not sustain the conviction, (ii) the court erred in instructing the jury that a driver's license was required to drive a golf cart on a public highway, and (iii) the court erred in declaring unconstitutional a Peachtree City municipal ordinance allowing unlicensed drivers to drive golf carts on public highways. We hold that a driver's license is required to drive a golf cart on public highways and therefore affirm the conviction.

Construed in favor of the verdict, the evidence showed that police witnessed Coker driving a golf cart on a public highway shortly after 1 a.m. The activated their car's blue lights and siren, and Coker immediately drove the cart onto a golf cart path that paralleled the highway. Coker eventually stopped and consented to field sobriety tests, which he failed. Coker had no driver's license, as it had been suspended. A breath test showed his blood alcohol level to be over .14. He was charged with obstructing law enforcement officers, two counts of DUI and driving with a suspended license.

Coker moved to dismiss the suspended license charge, arguing that no license was required to drive a golf cart in Peachtree City. He pointed to a Peachtree City ordinance, which he claimed allowed 12-to 14-year-olds to drive golf carts on recreation paths and streets if accompanied by a licensed parent. The court held that OCGA 40-5-20 (a) preempted the ordinance and required drivers of all motor vehicles, including golf carts, to have a driver's license when driving on public highways. The court instructed the jury of the requirement for a driver's license, and Coker was found guilty on one of the DUI charges and the driving with a suspended license charge. Coker moved for a new trial, which was denied. He appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this court on the ground that no constitutional questions were raised or ruled on below. His appeal challenges the driving with a suspended license conviction only, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, that the jury charge regarding the need for a license to drive a golf cart was erroneous, and that the court erred in declaring the city ordinance unconstitutional.

1. Coker argues that the court erred in declaring the Peachtree City ordinance unconstitutional. We note, however, that the Supreme Court in its transfer order specifically determined that no constitutional questions were raised or ruled on in the trial court. Since this determination is final and binding, we cannot consider Coker's constitutionality arguments. Schmidt v. Feldman, 230 Ga. App. 500, 502 (2) (497SE2d 23); see Hardeman v. State, 247 Ga. App. 503 (1) (544 SE2d 481) (2001); Hindman v. State, 234 Ga. App. 758, 765 (5) (507 SE2d 862) (1998).

2. In his other two enumerations, Coker contends that he did not need a driver's license to drive a golf cart on a public highway. He argues that a golf cart is a motorized cart as defined in OCGA 40-1-1 (32) and is not subject to the general requirement that the driver have a license. He explains that since motorized carts receive special treatment in OCGA 40-6-330- and 40-60331, which statutes do not expressly require a license for drivers of motorized carts, one can infer that the legislature, which in another statute (OCGA 40-6-351) expressly required moped drivers to have a driver's license, did not intend to require motorized cart drivers to have a driver's license. He also notes that the Peachtree City ordinance did not require driver's licenses for golf cart drivers.

Coker's arguments lack merit. OCGA 40-5-20 (a) provides that "[n]o person, except those except those expressly exempted in this chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver's license under this chapter for the type or class of vehicle being driven." There is no contention that Coker was exempted in Chapter 5 of Title 40. Since the golf cart was a device in which a person may be transported upon a highway, it was a "vehicle" under OCGA 40-1-1 (75). Since it was self-propelled, it was a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 40-1-1 (33). Cf. Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Ins. Co., 267 Ga. 516, 519-520 (480 SE2d 842) (1997) (tractor is interpreted as a motor vehicle under uninsured motorist statute). Since Coker drove it upon a highway of this state, he was required to have a driver's license. See 1969 Op. Atty. Gen. 69-194 (drivers of go-carts on public highways must have driver's license).

Although the golf cart may have qualified as a motorized cart under OCGA 40-1-1 (32), nothing in the motorized cart statutes (OCGA 40-6-330; 40-6-331) exempts the drivers of such from having a driver's license when driving on the public highways of this state. The fact that the nearby moped statute (OCGA 40-6-351) reaffirms the need for a license for that type of motor vehicle does not lead to the conclusion that the motorized cart's statutes exempted motorized cart drivers from the general licensing requirement of OCGA 40-5-20 (a) for the drivers of "any motor vehicle." The motorized cart statutes authorize local governing authorities to license the motorized cart vehicle itself, not its driver (see OCGA 40-6-331 (b)), and to establish the conditions under which the carts may be operated upon local streets. Such operating standards, which must be posted along the affected streets (OCGA 40-6-331 (c)), obviously refers to the manner in which such vehicles may be operated, not to whether the drivers of such must be licensed.

Thus, the court did not err in instructing the jury that the golf cart driver here was required to have a driver's license. The evidence showed that Coker was driving a type of motor vehicle upon a public highway, that his license was suspended, and that he had received notice of the suspension. Thus, the evidence sufficed to sustain the driving with a suspended license conviction. See Keller v. State, 247 Ga. App. 599, 601 (2) (544 SE2d 511) (2001).